Infrastructure-Backed Authoritarianism: How China’s BRI Threatens Democracy in the Solomon Islands

By Kim Kunwoo

When the Solomon Islands switched diplomatic ties from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China in 2019, bulldozers followed close behind. Highways, ports, stadiums, and utilities rose almost overnight, financed under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Yet beneath the surface lies a more troubling construction project, one reshaping the foundations of the islands’ polity. Western concerns about the BRI in the Pacific have centered on the potential security implications of a Chinese military presence. Far less examined is how infrastructure-backed patronage has entrenched authoritarian tendencies within the Solomon Islands’ governance.

The country offers an unconventional case of democratic backsliding driven not by overt coercion, but by development itself. Due to weak transparency and limited independent oversight, the government has negotiated BRI deals behind closed doors, channeled foreign funding into clientelist networks, and weakened institutional checks and balances. The islands’ leadership has increasingly accounted itself to Beijing rather than to its own citizens for political gain. If left unaddressed, the Solomon Islands could become a cautionary tale for other fragile Pacific democracies, where foreign-backed development risks becoming a tool not for nation-building but for democratic erosion.

Political Vulnerabilities of the Solomon Islands

The political characteristics of the Solomon Islands have made the country vulnerable to the effects of BRI infrastructure projects. The Solomon Islands has maintained a parliamentary democracy since 1978, with regular elections and formal respect for civil liberties. In practice, however, institutional oversight remains weak and patronage politics deeply entrenched. A 2017 Transparency International report described the country as “very corrupt,” citing weak institutional integrity and widespread clientelism. Political instability has further compounded these vulnerabilities. Governments have frequently changed through votes of no confidence, and no prime minister served consecutive terms until recently. In such an environment, infrastructure projects become political resources used to reward allies and secure voter loyalty. BRI projects exacerbate this dynamic by bypassing normal budgetary processes. Political elites welcome them because, as one observer put it, “they bring the red flags, not the red tape.”

Diplomatic Shift and Infrastructure Politics

Prime Minister Sogavare’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognize China in September 2019 marked a decisive turning point. The switch was pushed through with minimal public consultation, sidelining debate and fracturing the ruling coalition. Dissent was not tolerated. Planning Minister Rick Hou was dismissed after abstaining from the cabinet vote on the diplomatic shift. Subsequent reporting revealed that Beijing allegedly provided financial inducements to secure political backing, with claims of payments reaching up to US$125,000 per politician. Several MPs publicly stated that both China and Taiwan had offered substantial sums to influence their votes. The process lacked meaningful deliberation, and alleged bribery undermined parliamentary scrutiny over a major foreign policy decision.

Following the diplomatic switch, the Solomon Islands signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China on BRI cooperation, paving the way for major infrastructure projects. These projects were soon instrumentalized to consolidate political power. The most prominent example was the 2023 Pacific Games, hosted by the Solomon Islands with significant Chinese financial backing. Beijing provided a grant of approximately 1 billion Solomon Islands dollars (US$119 million) for facilities such as the National Stadium. While the government framed the Games as a developmental success, critical issues, including nationwide medical shortages, remained unresolved. Sogavare further used the Games to justify postponing the 2023 national election, pushing through a constitutional amendment to delay the vote by one year. This move weakened electoral accountability and allowed the government to evade immediate public scrutiny over governance failures. Chinese support, notably free from political conditionality, enabled this maneuver in ways that would likely have provoked stronger objections from Western donors.

Clientelism and Authoritarian Shift

The influence of BRI extended beyond infrastructure into the Solomon Islands’ clientelist political economy. Since 2019, China has funded the Constituency Development Fund, previously supported largely by Taiwan. Beijing has also backed the National Development Fund, which is directly controlled by the prime minister and distributed exclusively to ruling party MPs, excluding the opposition.

These funds lack meaningful accountability mechanisms, creating significant corruption risks. The partisan allocation of public resources has weakened parliamentary independence by incentivizing MPs to support the executive rather than scrutinize it. In 2021, Chinese-funded disbursements totaling nearly US$3 million were reportedly directed toward pro-government MPs, widely interpreted as a strategy to avert a vote of no confidence.

The removal of Daniel Suidani, the Premier of Malaita Province, marked one of the most severe blows to democratic pluralism. Suidani was a vocal critic of the diplomatic shift to China and refused Chinese investment in his province. In 2023, he was removed through a provincial vote of no confidence, reportedly facilitated by bribery. One assembly member was recorded admitting to receiving payments in exchange for voting against Suidani. The episode illustrated how financial leverage was used to silence dissent and centralize authority, undermining local autonomy and democratic norms.

The China–Solomon Islands security agreement further expanded the government’s coercive capacity. Signed in April 2022 without parliamentary debate or public consultation, the pact permits Beijing to deploy police or military forces to assist in maintaining “social order.” The ambiguity of this mandate has raised concerns about potential repression of political opposition. Even before the agreement was finalized, China dispatched police advisers and anti-riot equipment following unrest in November 2021. Given China’s record of heavy-handed domestic policing, the agreement risks normalizing authoritarian security practices within the Solomon Islands.

Prospects for BRI and Autocratization

The April 2024 general election brought Jeremiah Manele to power, replacing Sogavare as prime minister. While Manele has adopted a less confrontational tone and re-engaged with regional partners such as Australia, key features of infrastructure-backed authoritarianism remain intact. In early 2025, Manele and the Chinese ambassador jointly launched the China-funded Auki Road Network Rehabilitation Project in Malaita Province, symbolically extending Chinese influence into a region previously resistant to it.

Oversight and transparency reforms have yet to materialize, and Sogavare continues to wield significant influence as finance minister, directly overseeing BRI-linked funds. Structural incentives for opaque governance therefore remain largely unchanged.

At the same time, it would be misleading to attribute the Solomon Islands’ democratic decline solely to China. Corruption, patronage, and weak institutions long predate the BRI. What Chinese infrastructure financing has done is magnify these existing vulnerabilities. BRI projects are often negotiated without public scrutiny, kept off-budget, and shielded from parliamentary oversight. Unlike institutions such as the IMF, China imposes few governance or transparency conditions on its lending and grants. This concentration of discretionary power in the executive has fostered clientelism and heightened corruption risks.

What This Means to the World

Infrastructure-backed authoritarianism represents a gradual and often overlooked pathway to democratic erosion. In the Solomon Islands, democratic institutions formally persist, but their substance has been hollowed out. Elections continue, yet foreign-funded patronage distorts political competition. Courts and oversight bodies exist, but executive power increasingly bypasses them. China’s involvement has not imposed authoritarianism outright; rather, it has enabled domestic actors to consolidate power with fewer constraints.

For Beijing, such outcomes align with its broader ambition to challenge liberal democratic norms without direct confrontation. Infrastructure investment becomes a vehicle for influence, particularly in fragile democracies where institutional safeguards are weak. If this model proliferates, it risks fostering an illiberal bloc aligned with China’s doctrine of non-interference. The Solomon Islands thus serves as a warning: development without democratic accountability can entrench authoritarian governance. Infrastructure can either strengthen democracy or quietly undermine it. The difference lies in transparency, oversight, and political will.

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